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FAIR USE: AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE?
Lydia Pallas Loren *
Abstract: The Supreme Court’s decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. solidified
the treatment of fair use as an affirmative defense. However, treating fair use as an
affirmative defense shifts the burden to the defendant while in most fair use cases plaintiffs
are able to easily prove a prima facie case of infringement. This Article identifies that,
despite its decision in Campbell, the Supreme Court has not yet undertaken a thorough
analysis of whether Congress intended fair use, as codified in Section 107 of the Copyright
Act, to be treated as an affirmative defense. In fact, as explored in this Article, the legislative
history cuts against viewing fair use as an affirmative defense, and the legislative history
explicitly confirms what the statute clearly states: Congress did not intend fair use to be an
affirmative defense; a defense, yes, but not an affirmative defense. The negative
consequences of labeling fair use an affirmative defense support shifting back to what
Congress intended. Fair use should not be seen as an affirmative defense, but should instead
be treated as a defense that shapes the scope of a copyright owner’s rights.
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INTRODUCTION
No one doubts that the fair use doctrine is a critically important part
of U.S. copyright law. 1 As the Supreme Court described in Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 2 fair use provides a guarantee of “breathing
space within the confines of copyright.” 3 If the doctrine holds this
critical place in the scheme of copyright, is the Supreme Court correct to
label fair use an “affirmative defense”?
In Campbell the Supreme Court not only repeated the declaration it
had first made less than ten years earlier, that fair use is an affirmative
defense, 4 it went further to comment on the burden that it thought
followed from that label. Specifically, in addressing the fourth factor
courts should consider when evaluating whether a use is fair—the effect
of the putative fair use on “the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work” 5—the Court stated: “Since fair use is an affirmative
defense, its proponent would have difficulty carrying the burden of
demonstrating fair use without favorable evidence about relevant
1. Indeed, the academic literature on the subject is rich and deep. See, e.g., Barton Beebe, An
Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549 (2008);
William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659 (1988);
Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax
Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982); Michael J. Madison, A PatternOriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1525 (2004); Pamela Samuelson,
Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537 (2009).
2. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
3. Id. at 579.
4. Id. at 590; Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985). Harper
& Row was the first time the Supreme Court used the label “affirmative defense.” A few lower
courts had used the label prior to the Supreme Court’s use of the term. See Ned Snow, The
Forgotten Right of Fair Use, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 135, 160, 161 n.146 (2011) (citing cases).
5. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2012). Section 107 provides four factors courts may consider in evaluating
whether a use is a fair use:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature
or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
Id.
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markets.” 6 In this sentence the Supreme Court not only cemented the
label “affirmative defense,” it also made clear the defendant should
shoulder the “burden of demonstrating fair use.” 7
Much has been written concerning the nature of fair use: Is it a right,
or merely a privilege? 8 Some might claim that my focus here is on a
much more mundane and procedural question: 9 Did Congress intend for
courts to treat fair use as an affirmative defense, or was the fair use
inquiry meant to be part of the prima facie inquiry into the question of
infringement? Indeed, for many fair use cases, the issue of the burden of
proof has not been a central component of the basis for the decision. The
power of the procedural argument, however, may take on increased
importance as courts begin more frequently to use the allocation of the
burden as a reason to deny defendants’ assertions of fair use. 10 More
fundamentally, “[s]ubstantive rights . . . are worth no more than the
procedural mechanisms available for their realization and protection.” 11
Part I of this Article provides background on the current approach to
the prima facie case of copyright infringement and the difference
between a defense and an affirmative defense. Part II explores the
Supreme Court’s statements concerning the nature of fair use as an
affirmative defense, taking the Court’s cases in reverse chronological
order. This section shows that the Court has not yet undertaken a
thorough analysis of whether Congress intended fair use, as codified in
Section 107 of the Copyright Act, to be treated as an affirmative defense.
After identifying the statutory language that cuts against treating fair use
as an affirmative defense, Part III then turns to the legislative history of
the 1976 Act. It describes the specific legislative history relied on by the
Supreme Court as well as other statements in the legislative history
6. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590.
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW (1985); Snow,
supra note 4.
9. Stephen B. Burbank, The Bitter with the Sweet: Tradition, History, and Limitations on Federal
Judicial Power—A Case Study, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1291, 1292–93 (2000). Professor Burbank
notes that “neglecting the terrain of procedure is, as it always has been, a mistake. Fundamentally,
that is because procedure is power, whether in the hands of lawyers or judges.” Id. Or as put more
succinctly by Congressman John Dingell, “I’ll let you write the substance . . . you let me write the
procedure, and I’ll screw you every time.” Regulatory Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 2327 Before
the Subcomm. on Admin. Law & Governmental Regulations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th
Cong. 312 (1983) (statement of Rep. John D. Dingell, Chairman, H. Comm. on Energy &
Commerce).
10. See, for example, Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014),
discussed below.
11. Burbank, supra note 9, at 1293.
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concerning the nature of the fair use doctrine, including language
contained in the final House and Senate Reports. The legislative history
explicitly confirms what the statute clearly states: Congress did not
intend fair use to be an affirmative defense—a defense, yes, but not an
affirmative defense. Part IV explores some of the consequences of
treating fair use as an affirmative defense and some of the legal
maneuvers employed by defendants and the courts to soften the more
serious problems. Finally, Part V argues that the Supreme Court should
revisit its use of the affirmative defense label and should conclude that
fair use is not an affirmative defense but is a mere defense that shapes
the scope of a copyright owner’s rights.
I.

BACKGROUND

A.

The Prima Facie Case of Infringement: An Easy Burden

Treating fair use as an affirmative defense shifts the burden to the
defendant with little needed from the plaintiff to demonstrate a prima
facie case of infringement, thus opening the door to the wide range of
remedies permissible under the Copyright Act. 12 For example, in a case
alleging infringement of the reproduction right, the plaintiff must prove
only ownership of a valid copyright (often demonstrated by presentation
of the copyright registration certificate) 13 and “copying of constituent
elements of the work that are original.” 14 Proving this actionable
copying typically has two components. First, the plaintiff must establish
actual copying—that the defendant copied from the plaintiff rather than
having independently created a similar work. In fair use cases, this first
component of actionable copying is almost always undisputed. The
second component of actionable copying requires the plaintiff to
establish that “the copying amounts to an improper or unlawful
appropriation.” 15 This element is also, often, quite easily demonstrated.
12. 17 U.S.C. §§ 502–505 (2012) (specifying the remedies available to include injunctive relief,
seizure and impoundment, actual damages, statutory damages, costs, and attorney’s fees). To be
entitled to the statutory damages that the Copyright Act provides as well as the possibility of an
award of attorney’s fees, the plaintiff also will need to demonstrate that the copyright in the work
had been timely registered. Id. § 412. The Supreme Court has noted the “potent arsenal of remedies”
provided to copyright owners. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433
(1984).
13. Indeed, for works first published in the United States, copyright registration is a prerequisite
to filing an infringement action. Id. § 411; see also Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154
(2010).
14. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).
15. See, e.g., Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir.
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What copying amounts to an improper or unlawful appropriation is
sometimes phrased as a showing that the defendant’s work has
“‘substantial similarity’ to protected expression in the earlier work.”16
To prove substantial similarity, a plaintiff must show “(i) that it was
protected expression in the earlier work that was copied and (ii) that the
amount that was copied is ‘more than de minimis.’” 17 To constitute
“protected expression” it must satisfy the requirement of originality.
However, the originality standard is exceedingly low, requiring only a
“modicum of creativity,” and again is often easily shown. 18
The remaining criterion of the prima facie case of infringement
requires only an evaluation of what the defendant copied: Was too much,
i.e. more than a de minimis amount, of the plaintiff’s copyrighted
expression copied? The prima facie case does not require any
examination of the reason that the defendant copied the expression or
any proof of harm to the plaintiff, which makes the determination of
how much copying is too much an abstract inquiry with no reference
point. However, factors that help anchor the determination of how much
is too much copying are embedded in the fair use inquiry. For example,
when considering the fair use question, courts are directed to consider
the purpose the copier seeks to achieve and the harm such copying
causes the copyright owner, both helpful considerations when
determining if defendant’s copying was improper. 19 Indeed, fair use
injects a much needed concept of harm to the copyright owner 20 to keep

1998) (quoting Laureyssens v. Idea Grp., Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 139–40 (2d Cir. 1992)).
16. Id. (citations omitted).
17. Tufenkian Imp./Exp. Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 131 (2d Cir.
2003) (citation omitted). While the Ninth Circuit employs a different terminology in the
infringement inquiry, involving an evaluation of both “intrinsic” and “extrinsic” similarity, the
ultimate elements the plaintiff must demonstrate to carry its prima facie case are the same. See, e.g.,
L.A. Printx Indus., Inc. v. Aeropostale, Inc., 676 F.3d 841, 848 (9th Cir. 2012). Indeed, in fair use
cases, often Ninth Circuit opinions do not even engage in the extrinsic and intrinsic inquiries. See,
e.g., Seltzer v. Green Day, 725 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2013); Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688
F.3d 1164, 1181 (9th Cir. 2012); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 817 (9th Cir. 2003).
18. Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 362. For an interesting discussion of how to change that
standard and why raising the bar for copyrightable expression might be a good idea see Joseph Scott
Miller, Hoisting Originality, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 451 (2009).
19. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, A Fresh Look at Tests for Nonliteral Copyright Infringement,
107 NW. U. L. REV. 1821, 1845 (2013) (arguing that in a case of nonliteral infringement it would be
appropriate to require the plaintiff to prove that the defendant copied “a substantial enough quantum
of expression from the plaintiff’s work as to cause commercial harm to the plaintiff’s actual or
reasonably foreseeable markets or to her incentives to engage in creative work”).
20. Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm, Foreseeability, and Fair Use, 85 WASH. U. L. REV.
969, 973 (2007) (defining the relevant copyright harm as “the uncompensated violation of an
exclusive right that would be likely to have a material effect on a reasonable copyright owner’s ex
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the scope of copyright owner rights from interfering with the underlying
constitutional objective of copyright law. 21 Instead of considering those
factors in the context of making a determination of whether the plaintiff
has demonstrated a prima facie case of infringement, courts hold the
prima facie case satisfied 22 and then turn to the defendant’s affirmative
defense of fair use.
B.

Defense Versus Affirmative Defense

The difference between treating fair use as a defense and treating it as
an affirmative defense is significant. Not only does the label “affirmative
defense” trigger a pleading obligation,23 but it also has an important
consequence when it comes to the burden of proof. A defense is simply a
“reason why the plaintiff . . . has no valid case.” 24 For example, a
defense could be that the copying engaged in by the defendant was not
an “improper” or “unlawful” appropriation (perhaps we would call the
defendant’s copying fair).
In contrast, the defendant bears the burden of proof for an affirmative
defense, although that obligation only becomes important after the
plaintiff has demonstrated its prima facie case. 25 An affirmative defense
stems from the common law pleading of “confession and avoidance”
pursuant to which the defendant would admit the plaintiff’s prima facie
case and allege new material that would defeat the plaintiff’s case and
excuse the defendant’s conduct. 26 As the Supreme Court has further

ante decision to create or distribute the work”).
21. The Constitution grants Congress the power to adopt a copyright act providing exclusive
rights to authors, but it also states a goal for the grant of that authority: “To promote the Progress of
Science . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. At the time of the Constitution, “Science” meant broadly
“knowledge and learning.” See Golan v. Holder, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 873, 888 (2012). But see
Ned Snow, The Meaning of Science in the Copyright Clause, 2013 BYU L. REV. 259, 259 (2013)
(arguing that the word “Science” had a more narrow meaning at the time of the framing).
22. There are a few cases in which the court concludes that the copying engaged in by the
defendant was de minimis, although those courts often note that such considerations could also be
handled in the context of the fair use defense. See, e.g., Faulkner Literary Rights, LLC v. Sony
Pictures Classics Inc., 953 F. Supp. 2d 701, 710–12 (N.D. Miss. 2013).
23. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that “[i]n responding to a pleading, a party must
affirmatively state any . . . affirmative defense . . . .” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1).
24. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 509 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “Defense”).
25. Id.
26. See 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1270 (3d ed. 2004). The problem of how to treat aspects of a civil case is by no means unique to
copyright law. For example, in basic tort law, a debate is just now surfacing concerning “whether
consent is an affirmative defense or whether lack of consent is an element of the plaintiff’s prima
facie case . . . .” See Nancy J. Moore, Intent and Consent in the Tort of Battery: Confusion and
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explained, when the burden of proof is placed on one party, that means
the burden of persuasion will remain with that party, even if the burden
of production may shift depending on the nature of the evidence each
party offers. 27
Determining whether a particular defense should be treated as an
affirmative defense is “not without some difficulty.” 28 The Fifth Circuit
has indicated that at least three related considerations may help in this
determination: “(1) whether the matter at issue fairly may be said to
constitute a necessary or extrinsic element in the plaintiff’s cause of
action; (2) which party, if either, has better access to relevant evidence;
and (3) policy considerations: should the matter be indulged or
disfavored?” 29 Given that the prima facie case of infringement already
requires the plaintiff demonstrate that the copying by the defendant was
“improper,” 30 it seems that whether a use is fair or not would constitute a
necessary or extrinsic element of the plaintiff’s cause of action. Further,
as discussed in more detail below, the copyright owner often has better
access to relevant evidence on the fair use factors. 31 Finally, because of
the important First Amendment role fair use plays in copyright law, 32
fair use should be indulged, or at least certainly not disfavored.
Placing the burden of proving or disproving fair use may play a
significant role in the outcome of a litigated case at a variety of stages,
from the issuance of a preliminary injunction 33 to the ultimate
determination of infringement liability. 34 And, of course, who bears the
burden of proving a use was (or was not) a fair use affects the settlement
posture of the parties, as well as the behavior of potential fair users even
prior to the filing or threat of litigation. 35

Controversy, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1585, 1586 (2012).
27. Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84, 101 (2008); see also Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 331–33 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing burdens of proof,
persuasion, and production in the summary judgment context).
28. Ingraham v. United States, 808 F.2d 1075, 1079 (5th Cir. 1987).
29. Id. (citation omitted).
30. See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text.
31. See infra Part IV.B.
32. See infra Part IV.C.
33. See, for example, Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1158 (9th Cir. 2007),
discussed below and infra notes 137–141 and accompanying text.
34. See Cambridge University Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014), discussed below,
and infra notes 129–134 and accompanying text.
35. See Ned Snow, Proving Fair Use: Burden of Proof as Burden of Speech, 31 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1781 (2010) (discussing the chilling effect on speech of treating fair use as an affirmative
defense).
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II.

THE SUPREME COURT AND THE EVOLUTION OF FAIR
USE INTO AN “AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE”

The Supreme Court has directly addressed arguments concerning
whether a defendant’s use is a fair use in only three cases: Sony
Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 36 Harper &
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 37 and Campbell v. AcuffRose Music, Inc. 38 Those three opinions, understandably, exert
enormous influence on the treatment of an assertion of fair use. In the
evolution of the doctrine of fair use into an affirmative defense carrying
consequences for the assignment of the burden of proof, the Campbell
opinion is, by far, the most significant. Of the many lower courts that
reflexively identify the fair use doctrine as an affirmative defense, most
cite Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., for that proposition. 39
A.

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.

A significant part of the Campbell opinion concerns the consequences
of employing presumptions in the fair use analysis—presumptions of
unfairness 40 and of market harm 41 that may or may not flow from the
defendant’s use being commercial. In the arguments concerning
presumptions, both the plaintiff and the defendants used the label of
affirmative defense.
First, the defendants as petitioners asserted in their opening brief:
“The statutory formulation of the defense of fair use in the Copyright
Act reflects the intent of Congress to codify the common-law
doctrine.” 42 Plaintiff-respondent Acuff-Rose was far more forceful in its
characterization. After noting that in drafting the fair use provision of the
statute Congress had “resisted pressures from special interest groups to
create presumptive categories of fair use,” and had instead “structured
the provision as an affirmative defense requiring a case-by-case

36. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
37. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
38. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
39. See, e.g., Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164, 1181 (9th Cir. 2012); Suntrust
Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1275 n.31 (11th Cir. 2001); Infinity Broad. Corp. v.
Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 1998).
40. Campell, 510 U.S. at 583–84.
41. Id. at 591.
42. Brief on the Merits for Petitioners at 8, Campbell, 510 U.S. 569 (No. 92-1292), 1993 WL
391046.
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analysis,” 43 respondent then turned to the resulting burden on the
defendants:
In assessing the evidence under [the § 107] factors, it bears
emphasis that fair use is an affirmative defense, see Harper &
Row, 471 U.S. at 561, and that, accordingly, the burden of
proving fair use lies with the proponent of the defense. H.R.
Rep. No. 836, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. at 3 n.3 (1992) . . . . 44
Responding to that assertion, the defendants failed to attack the
characterization of fair use as an affirmative defense 45 but instead
highlighted that the Supreme Court had also identified the doctrine as “a
mixed question of law and fact,” and that therefore the burden on the
defendant was “at best uncertain.” 46 At oral argument, Chief Justice
Rehnquist directly asked counsel for defendants, Bruce S. Rogow, if fair
use was an affirmative defense and counsel’s response was unequivocal:
QUESTION: Is fair use an affirmative defense?
MR. ROGOW: It is.
QUESTION: So the burden of negating fair use in a motion for
summary judgment, then, is on the person claiming the fair use?
MR. ROGOW: The ultimate burden is to show fair use as the
affirmative defense as these factors unfold . . . . 47
Defendants’ lawyer was not focused on the significance of that
concession. Instead, he was far more focused on undoing the
consequences of the presumptions that the Court of Appeals had
employed. The Court of Appeals had held that those presumptions,
stemming from language the Supreme Court had used in Sony
Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., made a use
“presumptively unfair” if a defendant’s use was commercial in nature. 48
This presumption shifted the burden onto the defendant to disprove the
“unfairness” of the use. Ultimately, the Supreme Court reversed the

43. Brief on the Merits for Respondent at 10–11, Campbell, 510 U.S. 569 (No. 92-1292), 1993
WL 391058 (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985))
44. Id. at 21. The statements contained in the 1992 House Report concerning a bill that sought to
add a new sentence to the end of § 107 are discussed below. See infra notes 104–111 and
accompanying text.
45. This failure was understandable given the Supreme Court’s use of the label in Harper & Row.
46. Reply Brief on the Merits for Petitioners at 4 n.2, Campbell, 510 U.S. 569 (No. 92-1292),
1993 WL 638228. For this assertion, defendants cited Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 561.
47. Transcript of Oral Argument at 19, Campbell , 510 U.S. 569 (No. 92-1292), 1993 WL
757656, at *19.
48. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 594.
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Court of Appeals and held that no such presumption was warranted. 49
Yet, by labeling fair use an affirmative defense, the Court had created a
presumption: without proof of the affirmative defense of fair use, the
plaintiff would prevail on its infringement claim due to the plaintiff’s
demonstration of its prima facie case of infringement.
In its opinion in Campbell the Supreme Court cited two sources
identifying fair use as an affirmative defense: its own opinion, from less
than a decade prior, in Harper & Row and a statement contained in a
1992 House Report. 50 The legislative history is explored in Part II,
below. The next section examines the treatment of fair use as a defense
in the Court’s Harper & Row decision.
B.

Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises

In Harper & Row the Court refers to fair use as a defense six times. 51
Only once, while discussing the first fair use factor, does the Court add
the adjective “affirmative.” 52 The distinction between a mere defense
and an affirmative defense is significant.53 Importantly, while the
plaintiffs in Harper & Row referred to fair use as a defense in their
briefs, 54 they never once used the significantly different label of
affirmative defense. The defendants never even used the label “defense”
in their brief 55 and neither term was uttered during the oral argument of
the case. 56
The paragraph from Harper & Row which contains the only reference
to fair use as an “affirmative defense” reads in full:
Purpose of the Use. The Second Circuit correctly identified
news reporting as the general purpose of The Nation’s use.
News reporting is one of the examples enumerated in § 107 to
“give some idea of the sort of activities the courts might regard

49. Id.
50. Id. at 590 n.20 (citing Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 561; H.R. REP. NO. 102-836, at 3 n.3
(1992)). These two sources were cited to the Court in Respondent’s Brief. See supra note 44 and
accompanying text.
51. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 549, 550, 551, 554, 561 (1985).
52. Id. at 561.
53. See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text. Part III explores the significance of this
distinction.
54. Brief for the Petitioners at 19 n.3, 29, 30, 31, 33, 37, 38, Harper & Row, 471 U.S. 539 (No.
83-1632), 1984 WL 565760; Reply Brief for the Petitioners at ii, 9, 13, 14 n.7, 15, 16, Harper &
Row, 471 U.S. 539 (No. 83-1632), 1984 WL 565762.
55. See Brief for Respondents, Harper & Row, 471 U.S. 539 (No. 83-1632), 1984 WL 565761.
56. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Harper & Row, 471 U.S. 539 (No. 83-1632).
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as fair use under the circumstances.” Senate Report, at 61. This
listing was not intended to be exhaustive, see ibid.; § 101
(definition of “including” and “such as”), or to single out any
particular use as presumptively a “fair” use. The drafters resisted
pressures from special interest groups to create presumptive
categories of fair use, but structured the provision as an
affirmative defense requiring a case-by-case analysis. See H.R.
Rep. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 37 (1967); Patry 477, n.4.
“[W]hether a use referred to in the first sentence of section 107
is a fair use in a particular case will depend upon the application
of the determinative factors, including those mentioned in the
second sentence.” Senate Report, at 62. The fact that an article
arguably is “news” and therefore a product use is simply one
factor in a fair use analysis. 57
It is this page to which the Campbell opinion refers. However, in
context, it is clear that in Harper & Row the Court was not concerned
with the consequences of labeling fair use an “affirmative defense” but
rather was concerned with rejecting the defendant’s argument that use of
copyrighted material as “news” meant the use was presumptively a fair
use. In fact, as discussed more fully below, the legislative history to
which the Court cites does not use the label affirmative defense and
instead provides: “The committee believes that any special statutory
provision placing the burden of proving fair use on one side or the other
would be unfair and undesirable.” 58
C.

Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.

The first time the Court addressed the fair use doctrine after the
enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act was in Sony Corporation of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 59 Tellingly, the Sony opinion
never refers to fair use as an affirmative defense, or even as a defense for
that matter. Instead, the Court focused on the statutory language, noting
that Section 106 prefaces the grant of rights to copyright owners as
“subject to sections 107 through 118” and that “[t]hose sections
describe a variety of uses of copyrighted material that ‘are not
infringements of copyright notwithstanding the provisions of § 106.’” 60

57. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 561 (citing S. REP. NO. 94-473).
58. H.R. REP. NO. 90-83, at 37 (1967). While this House Report is from 1967, the general
revision of the Copyright Act was not adopted until 1976.
59. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
60. Id. at 448.
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Even the dissenters, who would have found the use at issue to be
infringing, speak of fair use as one of “a number of exemptions and
limitations on the copyright owner’s rights.” 61 In other words, the first
time the Court addressed the codification of the fair use doctrine it
viewed fair use as part of what shapes the scope of a copyright owner’s
rights. As part of that overall inquiry, the Sony Court indicated some
presumptions could aid in the determination of whether a use was fair. 62
But Sony never assigned the burden of proof on any aspect of fair use to
the defendant.
Other Supreme Court opinions confirm a conception of fair use not as
an affirmative defense, but rather as an integral part of shaping the rights
of a copyright owner and even keeping copyright from transgressing the
First Amendment. 63 For example, in Eldred v. Ashcroft 64 the Court
relied heavily on fair use as one of “copyright’s built-in free speech
safeguards” 65 that significantly reduces the pressure to employ
heightened First Amendment scrutiny to congressional action relating to
copyright. 66 In Harper & Row, the Court rejected a separate First
Amendment defense to copyright infringement, relying instead on fair
use to safeguard the First Amendment interests at stake.67 As an
important balance in copyright that the Court has repeatedly pointed to
when considering separate First Amendment challenges to copyright
law, relegating fair use to the status of an affirmative defense weakens
its significant balancing role.
III.

THE TEXT AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1976 ACT

The first time the Supreme Court used the label “affirmative
defense” 68 it cited two sources as support: a 1967 House Report and a
treatise on copyright law. 69 Textualists assert that resort to legislative

61. Id. at 462 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 449 (majority opinion).
63. See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.
186, 221 (2003).
64. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
65. Id. at 221.
66. The Court holds that so long as Congress “has not altered the traditional contours of copyright
protection, further First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary.” Id.
67. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S 539, 555–60 (1985).
68. Id. at 561.
69. The treatise, written by William Patry, asserts that fair use is an affirmative defense and cites
for support two circuit court opinions and four district court opinions. PATRY, supra note 8. The
specific footnote of this treatise cited by the Supreme Court, footnote 4, cites the final House and
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history is only appropriate if the language of the statute is unclear. 70 On
the question whether fair use is an affirmative defense, one can view the
statute as quite clear: fair use is not an affirmative defense. The
legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act also supports this reading
of the statute by never once referring to fair use as an “affirmative
defense.” It is only in legislative material concerning later amendments
to the statute that the label of affirmative defense is used. These later
legislative materials do not provide adequate support for treating fair use
as an affirmative defense.
A.

Statutory Language

Section 106 conditions the rights granted to a copyright owner as
“subject to Sections 107 through 122.” 71 Additionally, Section 107
provides that “[n]otwithstanding the provisions of section[] 106 . . . the
fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of copyright.” 72
Combined, these two statutory sections seem to clearly support viewing
fair use not as an affirmative defense but rather as part and parcel of
what defines the rights of a copyright owner. 73 “Absent some reason to
believe that Congress intended otherwise, . . . the burden of persuasion
lies where it usually falls, upon the party seeking relief.” 74 It seems
appropriate that the plaintiff who seeks relief in a copyright infringement
Senate Reports, H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976) and S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 62 (1975), yet
neither of those Reports use the label “affirmative defense,” nor make any statement concerning the
burden of proof. PATRY, supra note 8, at 477 n.4. The footnote provides a “see also” citation to a
1984 House Report concerning proposed amendments to other sections of the Act that does use the
label “affirmative defense” when referring to fair use. Id. The footnote then discusses how, after
statements on early revision efforts in the legislative history indicated the burden of proof should
not be assigned to either party, the legislative history is then silent on the issue of who should bear
the burden of proof on fair use. Id.
70. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001); Ratzlaf v. United States,
510 U.S. 135, 147–48 (1994) (finding that where “[t]here are . . . contrary indications in the statute’s
legislative history . . . we do not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear”);
Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845
(1992); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 59 (1988); Michael H. Koby, The Supreme Court’s Declining Reliance on Legislative
History: The Impact of Justice Scalia’s Critique, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 369, 395 (1999) (noting the
“clear and unmistakable pattern of decline in the use of legislative history by the Supreme Court”).
71. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
72. Id. § 107.
73. Judge Birch has indicated his belief that the characterization of fair use as an affirmative
defense does not comport with the statutory language. See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co.,
268 F.3d 1257, 1260 n.3 (11th Cir. 2001); Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1542 n.22
(11th Cir. 1996).
74. Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 57–58 (2005).
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lawsuit must prove infringement including that a use is not a fair use.
The language of Section 108, identifying the “right of fair use,” 75
furthers the textual argument that the statute does not treat fair use as an
affirmative defense in the style of “confession and avoidance.” 76 A
defense is any reason that the plaintiff should not prevail.77 On the other
hand, an affirmative defense is relevant only once the plaintiff’s prima
facie case has been proven. 78 If fair use is “not an infringement,” then
the plaintiff has not met its burden to demonstrate a prima facie case of
infringement without overcoming the argument that the use is a fair use.
Some may argue that fair use is an “exception” and that when one
seeks to rely on an exception or an exemption from a statutory
prohibition, the burden of proving a “special exception to the
prohibitions of a statute generally rests on one who claims its
benefits.” 79 The statutory language contradicts treating fair use as an
exception: It is, “not an infringement,” instead a limitation on the scope
of the rights granted to copyright owners.
The phrasing of Section 107 can be contrasted with other limitations
placed on the rights that the Copyright Act grants to copyright owners.
For example, Section 109 provides that an owner of a lawfully made
copy of a copyrighted work “is entitled, without the authority of the
copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that
copy.” 80 This is a codification of the first sale doctrine, an affirmative
defense against the claim of infringement of the copyright owner’s right
to distribute copies of the copyrighted work to the public. 81 Tellingly,
Section 109 does not refer to such a resale as “not an infringement of
copyright”; rather, it provides an “entitlement” to the owner of a
lawfully made copy. 82 Another example is Section 1008, specifying that
“[n]o action may be brought under this title” for certain noncommercial
75. 17 U.S.C. § 108(f)(4) (providing that “[n]othing in this section . . . in any way affects the right
of fair use as provided by section 107”).
76. See supra note 26.
77. See supra note 24.
78. See supra note 25.
79. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 44–45 (1948); see also Javierre v. Cent.
Altagracia, 217 U.S. 502, 508 (1910) (opinion for the Court by Holmes, J.).
80. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a). Similarly, subsection (c) of Section 109 provides that the owner of a
lawfully made copy “is entitled . . . to display that copy publicly.” Id. § 109(c).
81. See Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2010).
82. For an argument that the right protected by 109 and the first sale doctrine is not an affirmative
defense see Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Reconciling Intellectual & Personal Property, 90
NOTRE DAME L. REV. (2015) (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2399983
(exploring the first sale doctrine and the requirement of ownership in a digital transactions).
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uses by a consumer of a digital audio recording device or medium. 83
Again, the statute does not identify this noncommercial use as “not an
infringement”; rather, it prohibits suit against such users.
Further, this approach to the fair use inquiry comports with the
statement of the prima face case of infringement. As described earlier,84
as part of its prima facie case of infringement a plaintiff must establish
that the copying amounts to an improper or unlawful appropriation. How
is a court to determine if the copying is “improper” or “unlawful”
without a reference to something? In some cases the threshold becomes
one of “more than de minimis” copying, examining the quantitative and
qualitative aspects of what has been copied. 85 Yet that inquiry,
concerning the amount that the defendant has copied, is a specific factor
in the fair use inquiry. 86 Indeed, determinations of the “propriety” of the
copying at issue would seem to call out for an inquiry into the fuller
context of the copying engaged in by the defendant. The language of
Sections 106 and 107 support such an approach.
B.

Legislative History of the 1976 Act

As just described, a strong case can be made that the statute is clear
and unambiguous concerning the nature of the fair use doctrine as being
part of the inquiry into the prima facie question of infringement. When a
statute is clear and unambiguous, one should not typically resort to
legislative history. 87 However, the Supreme Court cited legislative
history as support for labeling fair use as an affirmative defense.
Specifically, the Harper & Row decision cited page thirty-seven of a
1967 House Report. 88 Yet neither on page thirty-seven nor any other
page in that House report (or any other House or Senate Report leading
up to the Copyright Act of 1976), is the doctrine referred to as an
affirmative defense.

83. 17 U.S.C. § 1008. It is important to note that a digital audio recording device and medium are
specifically defined in the Act and exclude general-purpose computers. See A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1024–25 (9th Cir. 2001).
84. See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004).
86. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (directing courts to consider “the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole” when considering whether the use is a fair use).
87. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001). Even where “[t]here
are . . . contrary indications in the statute’s legislative history . . . we do not resort to legislative
history to cloud a statutory text that is clear.” Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147–48 (1994).
88. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985) (citing H.R. REP.
NO. 90-83, at 37 (1967)).
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The 1967 House Report specifically cited by the Supreme Court
contains eight pages addressing fair use. The second sentence of that
discussion identifies fair use as a “defense” to infringement: “The claim
that a defendant’s acts constituted a fair use rather than an infringement
has been raised as a defense in innumerable copyright actions over the
years, and there is ample case law recognizing the existence of the
doctrine and applying it.” 89 In the ensuing nine-page discussion, the
1967 House Report never uses the word “defense” again.
In fact, the Court’s label of “affirmative defense” is contradicted by
the very report to which the Court cited. A significant difference exists
between a defense and an affirmative defense. 90 Most importantly, an
affirmative defense is one on which the defendant bears the burden of
proof. Yet on the page of the House Report to which the Supreme Court
cites the first time it uses the label “affirmative defense,” the House
Report not only does not use the label, it expressly characterizes fair use
as not an affirmative defense: “The committee believes that any special
statutory provision placing the burden of proving fair use on one side or
the other would be unfair and undesirable.” 91 This is an express
disavowal of an intent to treat fair use as an affirmative defense.
The intent that the statute not be read to place the burden of proving
fair use on the defendant is a theme found in much of the legislative
history of the 1976 Act. In 1965 the head of the U.S. Copyright Office
issued a Supplementary Report explaining the modifications to the
previous bill made by new bills introduced in February 1965. 92 In that
Report, the Register describes the debate over treating fair use as an
affirmative defense and concludes that the draft bill refuses to adopt the
position of treating fair use as an affirmative defense:
The author-publisher interests have suggested that fair use
should be treated as a defense, with the statute placing the
burden of proof on the user. The educational group has urged
just the opposite, that the statute should provide that any
nonprofit use for educational purposes is presumed to be a fair
use, with the copyright owner having the burden of proving
otherwise. We believe it would be undesirable to adopt a special
rule placing the burden of proof on one side or the other. When
89. H.R. REP. NO. 90-83, at 29 (1967).
90. See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text.
91. H.R. REP. NO. 90-83, at 37 (1967).
92. SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF
THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION BILL, at foreword (Comm. Print 1965) (explaining the
report’s purpose to describe in detail the 1965 bills, H.R. 4347 and S. 1006, 89th Cong.).
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the facts as to what use was made of the work have been
presented, the issue as to whether it is a “fair use” is a question
of law. Statutory presumptions or burden-of-proof provisions
could work a radical change in the meaning and effect of the
doctrine of fair use. The intention of section 107 is to give
statutory affirmation to the present judicial doctrine, not to
change it. 93
Instead, Harper & Row’s single use of the label “affirmative defense”
set in motion the “radical change” the Register of Copyrights feared,
citing as support legislative history that did not, in fact, support such a
marked departure from the traditional fair use doctrine. And Campbell,
for all of the positive influence that decision has had on the doctrine of
fair use, 94 provided the cement that locked in treatment of fair use as an
affirmative defense.
While Harper & Row relied on a 1967 House Report, the general
revision of the Copyright Act was not adopted until 1976. 95 The final
House and Senate Reports also do not contain any reference to fair use
as an “affirmative defense” nor do they provide any statements
concerning the assignment of the burden of proof. Both reports use the
label “defense.” However, calling fair use a “defense” is entirely
consistent with fair use being a component part of what shapes the rights
of a copyright owner. Labeling something a “defense” does not
necessarily carry with it an obligation of proving the elements of the
defense. 96 It is the label of “affirmative defense” that indicates the shift
of the burden to the defendant. 97
93. Id. at 28.
94. See e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, Market Effects Bearing on Fair Use, 90 WASH. L. REV. 615
(2015) (reviewing the laudable analytical framework Campbell created for considering the bearing
of market effects on the fair use determination); Pierre N. Leval, Campbell as Fair Use Blueprint?,
90 WASH. L. REV. 597 (2015) (describing Campbell as a “beautifully reasoned opinion, which has
demonstrated in its twenty-one years that it provides a healthy framework for fair use analysis”); R.
Anthony Reese, How Much Is Too Much?: Campbell and the Third Fair Use Factor, 90 WASH. L.
REV. 755 (2015) (analyzing the important and beneficial change Campbell brought to the third
factor of the fair use analysis); Rebecca Tushnet, Content, Purpose, or Both?, 90 WASH. L. REV.
869 (2015) (exploring the evolution of the “transformative” inquiry in fair use case law following
Campbell).
95. The path to the Copyright Act of 1976 is a complicated one that began in the 1950s. “The
official legislative history is long, comprising more than 30 studies, three reports issued by the
Register of Copyrights, four panel discussions issued as committee prints, six series of
subcommittee hearings, 18 committee reports, and the introduction of at least 19 general revision
bills over a period of more than 20 years.” Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and
Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 865 (1987).
96. See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text.
97. Id.
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Several of the statements made by the Register in his 1965
Supplementary Report are echoed in the final House and Senate Reports,
including the desire to affirm the fair use doctrine but not to change it. 98
Giving affirmation to the extant judicial doctrine meant treating fair use
as part of the inquiry of infringement, not as an affirmative defense. 99
Indeed, in the case that is most often credited as the fountainhead of the
fair use doctrine, Folsom v. Marsh, 100 Justice Story did not cast his
inquiry as one based on a “defense”; rather, the factor-based evaluation
that we now call fair use was the central inquiry into whether the
defendant’s use invaded the right of copyright. 101 Justice Story described
the evaluation of the quantity of copying as “the real hinge of the whole
controversy, and involves the entire merits of the suit.” 102 While he did
not use the phrase “fair use,” he also never viewed the inquiry into the
magnitude of the copying, the reasons for it, or the harm to the plaintiff’s
market as anything other than the central question of infringement. As
described by Professor Ned Snow, for Justice Story “the principles of
fair use did not represent a doctrine independent from the question of
infringement that would merit a distinct label; those principles were part
and parcel with the criteria for determining infringement.” 103
Thus, if a court is interested in relying on the legislative history of the
1976 Copyright Act, rather than the clear statutory language, the
repeated discussion of not assigning the burden of proof to the defendant
and not changing extant fair use law indicates that it would be error to
conclude that Congress intended fair use to be treated as an affirmative
98. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976) (“Section 107 is intended to restate the present judicial
doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way.”); S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 62
(1975) (same).
99. See Snow, supra note 4, at 159–61 (2011) (discussing the state of the law at the time leading
up to the enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act).
100. 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
101. Christina Bohannan, Copyright Infringement and Harmless Speech, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1083,
1131 (2010) (“[B]ecause Folsom did not create a fair use defense as such, but rather redefined the
test of infringement, Folsom arguably would have required the copyright holder to bear the burden
of proof on the issue of harm as part of the burden to prove infringement.”).
102. Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 347.
103. Snow, supra note 4, at 147 (footnotes omitted). Professor Snow attributes the shift in
thinking of fair use as a defense first to a treatise published in 1925 by Richard DeWolf, id. at 155–
56 (citing RICHARD C. DEWOLF, AN OUTLINE OF COPYRIGHT LAW 143 (1925)), asserting that fair
use was based on a tacit consent. If based on tacit consent, then it would make sense to require the
defendant to prove the existence of such consent. The DeWolf treatise was then cited in a
subsequent copyright treatise in 1944 by a well-known commentator, Horace Ball. Id. at 157 (citing
HORACE G. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944)). DeWolf cited
no support for his description of fair use as stemming from a theory of implied consent, and the
cases Ball cited, when examined closely, do not support that conception of fair use. Id. at 155–57.
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defense.
C.

Later Legislative History

While Campbell relied on Harper & Row for its characterization of
fair use as an affirmative defense and Harper & Row had relied on a
House Report that did not label fair use an affirmative defense,
Campbell also cited a later 1992 House Report. 104 This House Report
concerned a bill, H.R. 4412, that proposed adding a final sentence to the
end of Section 107 relating to the fair use of unpublished works. 105 The
addition of that final sentence to Section 107, as spelled out in the House
Report, was meant “to clarify the intent of Congress that there be no per
se rule barring claims of fair use of published works.” 106 That
amendment, itself, had nothing to do with the fundamental nature of the
doctrine of fair use. “Post-enactment legislative history (a contradiction
in terms) is not a legitimate tool of statutory interpretation.” 107
Campbell, however, cites this 1992 House Report as support for the
characterization of fair use as an affirmative defense. The “Summary
and Purpose” Section of the 1992 House Report provides:
The purpose of H.R. 4412 is to clarify the intent of Congress
that there be no per se rule barring claims of fair use of
published works. Instead, consistent with Congress’s
codification of fair use in the 1976 Copyright Act, the courts are
to determine the affirmative defense of fair use of unpublished
works on a case-by-case basis, after consideration of all the
factors set forth in Section 107, title 17 United States Code, as
well as any other factors a court may find relevant. The purpose
of this legislation is thus to direct the courts to give proper
weight to all factors; it is not the committee’s intention to direct
the courts how much weight to give to any factor in a particular
case. 108
The 1992 Report later repeats the affirmative defense statement,
adding that as an affirmative defense, fair use “is relevant only after a
copyright owner has made out a prima facie case of infringement.” 109

104. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 n.20 (1994) (citing H.R. REP. NO.
102-836, at 3 n.3 (1992)).
105. H.R. REP. NO. 102-836, at 1.
106. Id.
107. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1081 (2011).
108. H.R. REP. NO. 102-836, at 1.
109. Id. at 3.
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The only authority cited by this House Report to support this assertion is
Harper & Row. 110 This 1992 House Report should not be accorded the
weight of contemporary legislative history; it is dubious support for
congressional intent concerning a law passed over fifteen years earlier,
in 1976. 111
***
In the end, the support for concluding that Congress intended the
codification of fair use in the 1976 Copyright Act to signal a shift from
treating fair use as a defense to treating it as an affirmative defense is
non-existent. Describing fair use as an affirmative defense has gone
largely without question since the time of Harper & Row. 112 However,
the Supreme Court is not foreclosed from ruling on the nature of fair use.
As the Court has noted, “cases cannot be read as foreclosing an
argument that they never dealt with.” 113 Given the consequences that
flow from treating fair use as an affirmative defense, the Court should
examine the statute, the legislative history, and the policy behind fair use
and conclude that fair use is part of the inquiry into the prima facie
question of infringement.

110. Id. at 3 n.3. The Report also criticizes as contrary to Harper & Row an unpublished district
court opinion that “erroneously held that where the copyright owner seeks a preliminary injunction,
the copyright owner bears the burden of disproving the defense.” Id. (citing Coll. Entrance
Examination Bd. v. Cuomo, 90-CV-437, at *11 n.7 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 1992)). This footnote goes
on to specify that “the burden of proving fair use is always on the party asserting the defense,
regardless of the type of relief sought by the copyright owner” citing only Harper & Row for
support. Id.
111. Post-enactment legislative history has “little probative value because a post-enactment
legislative body has no special insight regarding the intent of a past legislative body.” Laborers’
Local 265 Pension Fund v. iShares Trust, 769 F.3d 399, 409 (6th Cir. 2014). The Supreme Court
has noted that “even when it would otherwise be useful, subsequent legislative history will rarely
override a reasonable interpretation of a statute that can be gleaned from its language and legislative
history prior to its enactment.” Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S.
102, 118 n.13 (1980).
112. Judge Birch of the Eleventh Circuit, while acknowledging that the Supreme Court has
indicated that fair use is an affirmative defense, nonetheless has articulated that as a matter of first
principles, fair use should not be seen as an affirmative defense. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin
Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1260 n.3 (11th Cir. 2001).
113. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 678 (1994) (plurality opinion) (citing United States v.
L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 38 (1952)); see also Miller v. Cal. Pac. Med. Ctr., 991
F.2d 536, 541 (9th Cir. 1993) (“It is a venerable principle that a court isn’t bound by a prior decision
that failed to consider an argument or issue the later court finds persuasive.”).
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CONSEQUENCES OF TREATING FAIR USE AS AN
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Campbell’s use of the affirmative defense label, with its further
statement concerning the burden that follows from that label, has led to
certain consequences relating to the fair use doctrine. From pleading to
proof, from settlement to chilling creative activity and speech, treating
fair use not as a mere defense but as an affirmative defense impacts both
litigation and behavior.
A.

Pleading

As an affirmative defense, fair use is subject to the pleading
requirement of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
mandating a statement of affirmative defenses in the defendant’s
answer. 114 Failure to plead an affirmative defense generally results in a
waiver of that defense. 115 Also, courts generally lack the ability to raise
an affirmative defense sua sponte. 116
Courts do not always strictly adhere to this pleading requirement. For
example, courts have granted dismissals on the basis of a clear fair use
without waiting for an answer pleading the affirmative defense.117
Particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s more recent articulation of a
heightened pleading standard in Ashcroft v. Iqbal 118 and Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 119 if fair use were not treated strictly as an affirmative
defense, we could see more pre-answer dismissals in cases of clear fair
use because the plaintiff’s claim of infringement is not plausible. 120
More recently however, Iqbal and Twombly, may in fact be having

114. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c) (“In responding to a pleading, a party must affirmatively state any
avoidance or affirmative defense.”); see also Latimer v. Roaring Toyz, Inc., 601 F.3d 1224, 1239–
40 (11th Cir. 2010).
115. Latimer, 601 F.3d at 1239 (citing Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 678 F.2d 992,
1012 (11th Cir. 1982)).
116. Id. (quoting Hutcherson v. Lauderdale Cnty., Tenn., 326 F.3d 747, 757 (6th Cir. 2003)).
117. See Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687, 690 (7th Cir. 2012)
(rejecting the argument “that an unpleaded affirmative defense of fair use is an improper basis for
granting a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)” and affirming dismissal of copyright
infringement claim on fair use grounds under Rule 12(c)).
118. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
119. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
120. For an example of a court’s willingness to do this, see Faulkner Literary Rights, LLC v.
Sony Pictures Classics Inc., 953 F. Supp. 2d 701, 712 (N.D. Miss. 2013) (combining an inquiry into
substantial similarity, de minimis copying, and fair use to conclude the plaintiff’s claim of copyright
infringement should be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)).
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the opposite effect. Specifically, lower courts have held that the
plausibility standard articulated in Iqbal and Twombly applies to
affirmative defenses. 121 Thus, treating fair use as an affirmative defense
means that not only must a defendant assert fair use in the answer to the
complaint, but the defendant must also allege sufficient facts that make
fair use plausible. Without such facts, a court may grant a motion to
strike the defense of fair use, removing consideration of the defense
from the case early in the proceedings. 122
B.

Burdens of Proof

Who bears the burden of proof in a civil case, provides a “winner” in
the case of a tie. When the evidence is in equipoise, the party on whom
the burden of proof rests loses. 123 Thus, treating fair use as an
affirmative defense requires the defendant to produce sufficient
evidence 124 on which a court could find in favor of the defense. The
Campbell Court made that clear in the penultimate paragraph of the
opinion:
[I]t is impossible to deal with the fourth factor [of the fair use
analysis] except by recognizing that a silent record on an
important factor bearing on fair use disentitled the proponent of
the defense, [the defendant] 2 Live Crew, to summary judgment.
The evidentiary hole will doubtless be plugged on remand. 125
Clearly the court placed the burden of producing evidence to support fair
use on the defendant.
Presenting sufficient evidence often is identified as the burden of
production. In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., the Supreme Court
commented on the nature of the burden that it thought the defendant
bore. Specifically addressing the fourth factor of fair use, market harm,
the court stated: “Since fair use is an affirmative defense, its proponent
121. See, e.g., Barnes v. AT & T Pension Benefit Plan–Nonbargained Program, 718 F. Supp. 2d
1167, 1171–72 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
122. See Erickson Prods., Inc. v. Kast, No. 5:13-CV-05472 HRL, 2014 WL 1652478, at *4 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 23, 2014) (granting motion to strike defendant’s fair use defense, albeit with leave to
amend).
123. Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer, v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 56 (2005) (noting that the burden of
persuasion answers “which party loses if the evidence is closely balanced”). The Court has noted
that, “[i]n truth, however, very few cases will be in evidentiary equipoise.” Id. at 58.
124. That evidence would need to meet the standard applicable in a civil case: a preponderance of
the evidence.
125. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 594 (1994). On remand, the parties
agreed to a settlement that gave 2 Live Crew a license to use ‘‘Oh, Pretty Woman.’’ See STAN
SOOCHER, THEY FOUGHT THE LAW: ROCK MUSIC GOES TO COURT 189–90 (1999).
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would have difficulty carrying the burden of demonstrating fair use
without favorable evidence about relevant markets.” 126 For a defendant,
such favorable evidence would mean proving the lack of harm to
relevant markets. Yet evidence of the presence of something (harm),
rather than evidence of the absence of something (lack of harm), is often
far easier evidence to provide, and “a determination . . . which party, if
either has better access to relevant evidence” is a relevant consideration
when considering whether a defense should be treated as an “affirmative
defense.” 127 In the context of a copyright infringement lawsuit, the
plaintiff typically is in a better position to provide evidence of the
presence of harm to relevant markets if such harm exists. 128 Thus
characterizing fair use as an affirmative defense places the burden on the
wrong party.
At least one recent fair use case has endorsed the appropriateness of
shifting the burden of production in just this context. The Eleventh
Circuit has held that it in some circumstances, it is “reasonable to place
on Plaintiffs the burden of going forward” with evidence on the fourth
factor. 129 The court looked to employment discrimination law as an
example of this burden shifting approach. 130 It noted that it was adopting
this burden shifting approach because of the facts of the case at bar:
“This approach merely recognizes that this is a case wherein one party
126. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590.
127. Ingraham v. United States, 808 F.2d 1075, 1079 (5th Cir. 1987).
128. Requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate some harm caused by the defendant’s conduct is
consistent with copyright law’s historical roots in tort doctrine. See Bohannan, supra note 20, at
974–81 (exploring the historical approach to harm in copyright law). In addition to the fourth factor
and its inquiry into the harm to the copyright owner’s markets, Section 107 directs courts to
consider the purpose of the use. 17 U.S.C. §107(1) (2012). In general, courts have focused on the
objective manifestations of that purpose rather than the putative fair user’s subjectively intended
purposes. See, e.g., Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 707 (2d Cir. 2013) (noting what matters is not
the “stated intention” of the creator of the alleged infringing work, but rather how the work “appears
to the reasonable observer”). For a further discussion of the role of intent in a fair use analysis, see
Eva Subotnik, Intent in Fair Use, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 935 (2014). A focus on objective
manifestations of the purpose of the work does not rely on evidence to which the defendant has
better access.
129. Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1279 (11th Cir. 2014).
130. Id. Specifically the Eleventh Circuit cited Verbraeken v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 881 F.2d
1041 (11th Cir. 1989): “[I]n a case brought pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
‘the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proving that age was a determinative factor in the
employer’s decision to terminate his employment,’ but that after the plaintiff establishes a prima
facie case of discrimination, this creates a presumption that age was a determinative factor and the
defendant then has the burden to go forward with evidence of ‘a legitimate, non-discriminatory
rationale for the discharge,’ after which the plaintiff must prove that the employer’s purported
reason was merely a pretext.” Cambridge Univ. Press, 769 F.3d at 1279 (quoting Verbraeken, 881
F.2d at 1045).
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has all the evidence on a particular issue, and so it is equitable to require
that party to go forward with the evidence.” 131
Even the Eleventh Circuit, however, notes that while the burden of
production may shift, because fair use is an affirmative defense, the
burden of persuasion remains with the defendant. 132 At common law, the
burden of proving “affirmative defenses—indeed, ‘all . . . circumstances
of justification, excuse or alleviation’—rested on the defendant.” 133 This
common law rule accords with the general evidentiary rule that “the
burdens of producing evidence and of persuasion with regard to any
given issue are both generally allocated to the same party.” 134 The need
to shift the burden of production is an indication that the burden of
persuasion on fair use has not been properly allocated.
One tactic to meet the burden of production that defendants asserting
fair use have successfully employed is to use various discovery tools to
force the copyright owner to acknowledge a lack of any evidence of
harm. For example, when the Authors Guild sued HathiTrust, asserting
that its use of the corpus of scanned books from the collection of
HathiTrust member libraries constituted infringement, HathiTrust
claimed there was no evidence of harm to any relevant markets. In
interrogatories, defendant HathiTrust requested the Authors Guide
“identify ‘any specific, quantifiable past harm, or any documents
relating to any such past harm,’ resulting from any of the Libraries’ uses
of their works.” 135 When the Authors Guild identified none, both the
district court and the Second Circuit accepted this as evidence favorable
to the defendant in ruling that the use was fair. 136
In addition to having consequences for pleading requirements and for
the burden of production, treating fair use strictly as an affirmative
defense makes resisting motions for preliminary injunctions more
difficult. When a copyright owner moves for a preliminary injunction
the owner must prove a likelihood of success on the merits.137 When the
defendant raises the defense of fair use, because the burden of proving

131. Cambridge Univ. Press, 769 F.3d at 1279 n.34.
132. Id. at 1280.
133. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *201).
134. 2 JOHN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 337 (5th ed. 1999).
135. Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 99 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing Brief for Appellee
at 38 (citing Pls.’ Resps. to Interrogs.)).
136. Id.
137. Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 79 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006)).
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that defense has not been placed on the copyright owner, demonstrating
a likely lack of fair use is not required. 138 Instead, defendant must show
that the defense of fair use is likely to succeed.139 The relative ease of
granting a preliminary injunction in a copyright infringement case has
serious consequences for freedom of speech. Copyright, by its nature,
concerns creative expression. 140 When copyright is used to enjoin the
defendant’s activity, it is often being used to prevent the defendant from
speaking in the defendant’s desired way. 141 By placing the burden on the
defendant, treating fair use as an affirmative defense makes it easier for
the plaintiff to obtain a requested preliminary injunction.
C.

Amplifying the Burden on Speech

The First Amendment ramifications of treating fair use as an
affirmative defense extend beyond the preliminary injunction context.
Because fair use is fundamental to protecting free speech rights and to
keeping copyright from requiring “further First Amendment scrutiny,” 142
placing the burden of proof on the defendant is problematic. 143 Many fair
uses involve speech activities. 144 Yet characterizing the fair use doctrine
as an affirmative defense places a burden on the speaker to prove an
entitlement to speak. Contrast that with requiring one who seeks to
silence particular speech to prove a clear entitlement to prevent that
speech. Treating fair use as an affirmative defense places an unnecessary

138. In 2007 a panel of the Ninth Circuit directly addressed this issue, first ruling that the
copyright owner “had the burden of demonstrating a likelihood of overcoming [the defendant’s] fair
use defense under 17 U.S.C. § 107.” Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 714 (9th
Cir. 2007), amended and superseded on reh’g, 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007). However, upon
rehearing the panel held “[b]ecause ‘the burdens at the preliminary injunction stage track the
burdens at trial,’ once the moving party has carried its burden of showing a likelihood of success on
the merits, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to show a likelihood that its affirmative
defense will succeed.” Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1158 (9th Cir. 2007)
(quoting Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 429 (2006)).
139. Perfect 10, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1158.
140. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (identifying that copyright protection exists in “original works of
authorship”).
141. Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual
Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 165–69, 182–89 (1998) (exploring copyright as a restraint on
speech and the particular problems with preliminary injunctions in copyright infringement cases).
142. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003).
143. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts After
Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 697, 719–22 (2003) (arguing that placing
the burden of proof on the defendant violates due process first amendment rights).
144. Snow, supra note 35, at 1793–95.
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and inappropriate burden on free speech. 145
Even prior to the filing of any lawsuit, treating fair use as a defense
chills more speech than if fair use were considered part of the analysis of
infringement. 146 Knowing that entitlement to rely on fair use requires
one to prove that defense may deter speech that would otherwise occur if
the burden were allocated differently.
The case-by-case nature of fair use 147 amplifies the chilling effect of
treating fair use as an affirmative defense.148 Because the Supreme Court
has held that fair use determinations are not to be simplified by bright
line rules, the exact contours of what constitutes fair use are illdefined. 149 This lack of definition makes reliance on fair use troubling
from a free speech perspective. The burdens imposed by vague statutes
directed at speech heighten the First Amendment concerns.150 “The
inherent uncertainty of fair use magnifies a defendant’s burden of
proof . . . .” 151 These significant First Amendment consequences further
bolster the approach to treating fair use as part of the inquiry into
infringement, not as a separate inquiry to be undertaken after the
plaintiff has demonstrated more than de minimis copying. 152
V.

TREATING FAIR USE DIFFERENTLY—AS A DEFENSE

Campbell’s embrace of the notion that fair use is an affirmative
defense was not simply part of the evolution of the fair use doctrine.
Rather, it was an error of statutory interpretation with seriously
problematic First Amendment consequences. Twenty years have passed
since the Campbell decision. Is it too late to reconsider this fundamental
aspect of fair use?
In codifying the doctrine of fair use there is indication in the

145. See id.
146. Id. at 1795–98.
147. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994).
148. Some have also noted that the exceedingly long duration of copyright makes the burden on
speech even more significant. See, e.g., Kate O’Neill, The Content of Their Characters: J.D.
Salinger, Holden Caulfield, Fredrik Colting, 59 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 291, 333–34 (2012).
149. Professor Pamela Samuelson argues that fair use cases fall into predictable patterns that
make anticipating the boundaries of fair use easier to discern than many fear. Pamela Samuelson,
Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2541–43 (2009).
150. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L.
REV. 1 (2001).
151. Snow, supra note 35, at 1791.
152. See supra Part I.A (discussing the ease of proving the elements of the prima facie case of
infringement).
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legislative history that Congress did not intend
to freeze the doctrine in the statute, especially during a period of
rapid technological change. Beyond a very broad statutory
explanation of what fair use is and some of the criteria
applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to
particular situations on a case-by-case basis. Section 107 is
intended to restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to
change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way. 153
This legislative history envisions the fair use doctrine evolving to
address new uses on a case-by-case basis. It does not appear to endorse a
blank check approach, allowing the Supreme Court to fundamentally
alter the nature of the doctrine of fair use. There is an important
difference between treating fair use as addressing the appropriate scope
of a copyright owner’s rights and the propriety or impropriety of a
defendant’s use of copyrighted expression, and requiring the defendant
bear the burden of proof concerning important factors that inform a
careful case-by-case evaluation of the unlawfulness of defendant’s
conduct.
Given the negative consequences of treating fair use as an affirmative
defense identified in Part IV, what would happen if courts approached
fair use as merely a defense, not an affirmative defense? The pleading
requirement would fall away, although certainly many defendants would
raise the defense in their answers. If fair use were not an affirmative
defense, an omission of the defense from the answer would not preclude
consideration of the doctrine by the court. More significantly, as directed
by the statutory language, considerations of the four factors identified in
Section 107 would become part of the analysis of whether or not the
defendant’s actions constitute an infringement. 154 And with the plaintiff
bearing the burden of proving infringement, which would encompass
proof that the use was not fair, when the evidence was in equipoise,
when the question of fair use was a close one, the plaintiff’s prima facie
case would fail.
While Congress could act to clarify that fair use should not be treated
as an affirmative defense, it is also possible for the courts to re-examine
153. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976).
154. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). Section 107 provides that a fair use “is not an infringement.”
See supra Part II.A. As the Eleventh Circuit has done with the “affirmative defense” of fair use,
courts could employ a careful shifting of the burden of production in appropriate cases. See supra
notes 129–132 and accompanying text. For example, where the defendant might have better access
to relevant information concerning an element of fair use, it would be appropriate to shift the burden
of production to the defendant. However, the burden of persuasion as to whether the use is or is not
infringement would remain with the plaintiff.
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what Congress intended when it first codified the fair use doctrine. The
Supreme Court has not engaged in a detailed examination the statute, the
legislative history, and the policy arguments. If it did so, it should
conclude that fair use should be treated as a defense, but not an
affirmative defense.
CONCLUSION
In Campbell the Court reversed the Sixth Circuit in part because the
lower court had read one sentence in Sony to mean that there was a
presumption of unfairness when the defendant’s use was commercial.
Sony, however, had said just that. 155 But in Campbell, the Court held it
was not just error, but reversible error to employ such a presumption.
The Court expressly cautioned the lower courts to not take one isolated
statement out of context. Unfortunately, in Campbell, the court took one
isolated word, “affirmative,” used in Harper & Row and gave it more
heft than it deserved given the text of the statute and the legislative
history.
The difference between a “defense” and an “affirmative defense” may
seem to be one of degree, but in the context of fair use, it is an important
distinction with significant consequences. When a defendant asserts that
the reason he is not an infringer is that his activity is a fair use, the court
should consider the question of infringement holistically. The factors
that Congress provide in Section 107 are designed to help a court make
the assessment whether the use should be treated as an infringement
within the scope of the copyright owner’s rights or should, instead, be
classified as a fair use and be permitted without interference from the
copyright owner. Removing the modifier “affirmative” from our
understanding of the fair use doctrine, will make clear the appropriate
approach to fair use that Congress intended.

155. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S 417, 449 (1984) (stating that
“[i]f the [defendant’s product] were used to make copies for a commercial or profit-making purpose,
such use would presumptively be unfair”).

